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1. Introduction 
Combining environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency, tradable quota systems have become 
a central pillar in environmental policies of OECD countries. 
 
As a prime example, the European Union (EU) started off a large-scale international CO2 emission 
trading scheme in 2005 for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. The stringency of the EU trading 
scheme will be further increased in order to achieve the outspoken EU policy goal of a greenhouse gas 
emission cutback by 20 per cent in 2020 (compared to 1990).1 Likewise, proposals for domestic 
emission cap-and-trade systems are expected to come into force in the US under the new Obama 
administration following up on regional programs that have been already adopted by Northeastern 
(RGGI 2008) and Western states (WCI 2008). 
 
Along with emissions trading systems, various OECD countries pursue a substantial increase in their 
shares of renewable energy sources as an important complementary measure in the “fight against 
climate change” (European Commission 2008) and for other – more vague – reasons such as energy 
security or strategic technological innovation. Within its ambitious “20-20-20” plan, the EU promises 
to increase the share of renewables in overall EU energy consumption to 20 per cent by 2020.2 The EU 
proposal specifies national renewable targets for each member state, which can be met by over-
fulfilment in other countries through transfer of guarantees of origin (GO). The GO system can be 
combined with existing renewable support mechanisms such as feed-in tariffs or tradable green 
certificates (TGC), also referred to as renewable portfolio standard (RPS) (Neuhoff et al., 2008).3 The 
US also aims to increase its share of renewable energy, and according to Fischer (2006) nearly half of 
the US states have established an RPS or a state-mandated target for renewables. 
 
As the simultaneous use of tradable black (CO2) and green (renewables) quotas gain in popularity and 
stringency, it is important to properly understand not only the economic implications of each specific 
instrument but also how these instruments interact with respect to policy-relevant variables including 
technology mixes, carbon values, electricity prices, and overall cost of regulation. Ultimately, the 
interaction of black and green quotas must be discussed in the context of the prevailing policy targets. 
                                                     
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htm. 
2 The “20-20-20” EU strategy postulates a reduction of greenhouse gas emission of 20 per cent, a share of renewable energy 
sources of 20 per cent, and an increase of energy efficiency of 20 per cent by 2020. 
3 Feed-in tariffs are used in e.g. Germany, France and Spain, whereas TGCs are implemented in e.g. the UK and Italy (Italy 
also has a feed-in tariff for small plants). 
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If the main objective of both instruments is to reduce emissions of CO2, the issue of counterproductive 
overlapping regulation arises (Tinbergen 1952). In this case, a black quota “stand-alone” is first-best 
provided there are no other initial distortions and the additional instrument – here a green quota – will 
be at best redundant but likely generate excess cost.4 More generally, the latter could be seen as a price 
tag on green quotas for the composite of objectives different from emission reduction.5 
 
In this paper, we investigate the economic impacts of overlapping black and green quotas for the 
electricity system, which is the key sector targeted by CO2 emission regulation and promotion of 
renewable energy. Based on a stylized theoretical model we first derive analytical results for the 
impacts induced by a green quota which is imposed on a power market already regulated by a black 
quota. A central result is that renewable quotas improve the performance of the most carbon-intensive 
power generation technologies as compared to a black quota regulation alone. In other words: Green 
serves the dirtiest – an implication that protagonists of green quota systems might not like as it could 
undermine public support for green policies.  
 
Why does supply of the dirtiest technologies increase when the green quota is imposed?  The 
explanation is that policies to increase the share of green power as a first-order effect reduce the 
profitability of black power producers, and thus decrease their output. However, because total 
emissions are fixed by the black quota, the price of emissions falls, and this benefits the most 
emission-intensive technologies the most. As some black producers must increase their output given 
constant total emissions, the final result is higher output from the dirtiest technologies. We substantiate 
our theoretical findings with a numerical analysis for the German electricity system where we also 
quantify the implications of overlapping regulation on excess cost, carbon values and electricity 
prices. 
 
Our analysis complements several studies that have discussed the effects of combining black and 
green quotas (see González (2007) for a survey). Amundsen and Mortensen (2001) show within an 
analytical framework that an increased share of renewables in a closed electricity market will lead to 
lower CO2 prices. NERA (2005) provides a thorough discussion about how green quota schemes may 
                                                     
4 Böhringer et al. (2008) elaborate on the excess cost of overlapping regulation within the EU arising from the imposition of 
emission taxes on top of emission quota systems to reach the EU climate policy targets. Böhringer and Lange (2005) examine 
the trade-off between efficiency and harmonization of allocation rules across EU member states. 
5 Note that these other objectives – if properly defined – are nevertheless likely to be met in a more cost-effective way. For 
example, promotion of R&D research in green technologies would call for specific R&D subsidies rather than broad-based 
subsidies to green production. As Sorrell and Sijm (2003) point out, it is important that the objectives and trade-offs within 
the policy mix are explicit. See Hahn (1986) for a discussion of designing markets in the case with multiple objectives, and 
Bennear and Stavins (2007) for a discussion of using multiple instruments in a second-best world. 
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affect the electricity market when the black quota is already in place (see also Morthorst (2001) for an 
early contribution). A few simulation studies have quantified the effects of combining emission 
trading and support schemes for green technologies, including Rathmann (2007) and Abrell and Weigt 
(2008). However, none of these studies have laid out how a green quota serves the dirtiest power 
producers.  
2. Theoretical analysis of overlapping regulation 
In our theoretical analysis we consider a partial equilibrium model of a closed, competitive power 
market, with m producers of ‘green’ power and n producers of ‘black’ (non-green) power. Let G and B 
denote the set of green and black power producers, respectively. Power producers have cost functions 
ci(qi), where qi denotes production in firm i. As usual, cost functions are assumed to be twice 
differentiable and convex with ciq  > 0 and ciq q  > 0. Let q, qG and qB denote total production (and 
consumption), total green production and total black production, respectively.  
 
We further assume that emissions ei in each firm are proportional to production, i.e., ei= ai·qi, where ai 
denotes the emission intensity of firm i.6 There are no emissions from green power production, i.e., 
ai = 0 for i∈G (ai ≥ 0 for i∈B). Let pE=D(q) (D’ < 0) denote the inverse demand function, where pE  is 
the end-user price of electricity.  
 
Assume now that the government has introduced a ceiling ê on total emissions from the power sector, 
implemented through an emission trading system (ETS) where σ denotes the emissions price. 
Furthermore, assume that a green quota is imposed, so that green power must constitute at least the 
share α of total power production. Finally, assume that both the ceiling on emissions and the green 
quota are binding whenever they are imposed. 
 
Let us examine the effects in the power market of imposing the green quota when the ETS is already 
implemented. The green quota could be thereby implemented in different ways, e.g., via tradable 
green certificates, uniform or differentiated feed-in tariffs (possibly combined with an end-user tax).  
 
The maximization problem of black and green producers can then be characterized in the following 
way: 
                                                     
6 This assumption is quite realistic in the power market, where each power plant has a fairly fixed conversion rate between 
energy input and electricity output (except in start-up periods). Moreover, it provides a straightforward interpretation of the 
term ‘dirtiest technology’. Below we will briefly discuss the implications of having a more general cost function ci(ei,qi). 
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(1) ( )( )B i i i i iMax p q c q a q i Bσ − − ∈    
(2) ( )( )G i i i i iMax p q c q q i Gπ − + ∈    
where pB  and pG  denote the price black and green producers receive respectively, net of direct or 
indirect taxes/subsidies that do not distinguish between different green or different black 
technologies.7 πi denote technology-specific (direct or indirect) subsidies to green producers. Note that 
pE = pB + τ + τB = pG + τ + τG, where τ is a tax (or negative subsidy) on all energy use or production, 
and τB and τG are direct/indirect taxes/subsidies on respectively black and green energy production. 
First-order conditions are then: 
(3) ( )( )ii i B iqc q p a i Bσ= − ∈  
(4) ( )( )ii i G iqc q p i Gπ= + ∈ . 
Next, we totally differentiate equations (3) and (4) to get: 
(5) ( )( )i ii i i B iq qc q dq dp a d i Bσ= − ∈  
(6) ( )( )i ii i i G iq qc q dq dp d i Gπ= + ∈ .  
We examine the case where the green quota α is increased marginally. Because of the binding 
emission constraint we must have ∑ai·dqi = 0. Thus, if one black producer reduces production, then 
there exists some other black producer that increases production. We assume that dpB ≤ dpE, which 
holds in the absence of new subsidies (or reduced taxes) to end-users or black producers. By 
multiplying equation (5) by dqi and then summing up over all i∈B we obtain: 
(7) ( )( )2( )i ii i i B i i i B Bq q
i B i B i B
c q dq dp dq a dq dp dq
∈ ∈ ∈
= + =   . 
Assume that ai ≠ aj for at least one pair (i,j), which implies that dqi ≠ 0 for at least one i.8 The left-hand 
side of equation (7) is then strictly positive, which means that dqB and dpB  must have the same sign 
(and differ from zero). If dqB is positive, then dq is also positive, and so dpE must be negative due to 
the demand function. However, then dpB  is also negative, violating the equation. Consequently, we 
must have dqB < 0 and dpB  < 0.  
                                                     
7 By indirect taxes/subsidies, we mainly think of green certificate markets, which provide an extra revenue to green producers 
and an extra cost to black producers (or to consumers). 
8 If dqi = 0 for all i∈B, equation (5) tells us that we must either have ai = aj for all i, j, or dσ = 0. However, dσ = 0 implies 
that 0 = dpB ≤ dpE, which (from the demand side) is impossible because we have dq > 0 whenever dqB = 0. Thus, dqi = 0 for 
all i∈B implies ai = aj for all i, j, in which case there is no meaning in the term ‘dirtiest’ black technology. 
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Equation (5) then implies that dσ < 0, because otherwise we would have dqi < 0 for all i∈B. 
Furthermore, let â be defined so that dpB − âdσ = 0. Then we have from equation (5) that dqi < 0 for all 
black firms with ai < â and dqi > 0 for all firms with ai > â. In other words, the dirtiest technologies 
increase their production, whereas the least dirty black technologies decrease their output. 
We state this main finding in the following proposition:9 
 
Proposition 
Consider a competitive power market that is initially regulated by a binding emission trading system. 
Assume that firm-specific emissions are proportional to production. Introducing a binding green 
quota will then i) decrease total black production, ii) decrease output from the least emission-intensive 
black technologies, and iii) increase output from the most emission-intensive technologies.  
 
Why do output from the most emission-intensive power producers increase when the green quota is 
imposed? The basic intuition is that policies to increase the share of green power will, as a first-order 
effect, reduce the profitability of black power, and thus reduce output from all black producers. 
However, because of the binding emission ceiling, the second-order effect is a reduction in the price of 
emissions. This benefits the most emission-intensive technologies the most. Thus, whereas the first-
order effect affects all black technologies symmetrically (and negatively), the second-order effect is 
asymmetrical. As some black producers must increase their output in order to keep total emissions 
constant, we end up with higher output from the dirtiest technologies. This result is in sharp contrast to 
the case where there is no ETS in place, in which case all black producers reduce their output (see e.g. 
Fischer, 2006). 
 
The results above are independent of the policy instrument choice for promoting green power 
production. The effects on the end-user price of electricity and output from individual green producers, 
however, depend on the chosen policy. The two most common instruments to stimulate green power 
production are tradable green certificate (TGC) markets and feed-in tariffs. In Appendix 1 we show 
that TGC markets and uniform feed-in tariffs financed by an end-user tax on electricity consumption 
are in fact equivalent. We also show that such policies will increase output from all green power 
producers. 
                                                     
9 With a more complex cost function of the form ci(ei,qi), and standard assumptions about derivatives, the only change would 
be to replace ai with (-cqe/cee) in equation (5). Thus, producers with (-cqe/cee) > â would increase their output. The fraction (-
cqe/cee) is reduced to ai in the case with emissions proportional to output. 
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The effect on the end-user price of electricity is ambiguous (cf. Appendix 1).10 This is in line with 
what Fischer (2006) finds when she examines the effects of TGC alone: The sign of the price effect is 
ambiguous and depends on the supply elasticities of green and black electricity producers. However, 
the likelihood of a price decrease is higher in our case when an ETS is already in place, because the 
reduced emissions price has a stimulating effect on black production. Still, a price increase can occur 
if the black producers have very different emission intensities, and the green producers have much 
steeper marginal cost than the least emission-intensive black producers. 
 
Most countries with feed-in tariffs differentiate the tariff between technologies. The least mature 
technologies, such as photovoltaic, typically have a higher tariff than the more mature technologies, 
such as onshore wind power. In this case, there is no equivalence between TGC and feed-in tariffs, and 
some green producers may become worse off if their tariff is relatively small and the price of 
electricity falls. 
 
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, introducing a green quota in addition to the black quota 
increases the cost of reducing CO2 emissions; differentiated feed-in tariffs are thereby more costly 
than uniform tariffs if the ultimate goal is to reach a certain share of green power (and keep emissions 
below a certain target). These results are straightforward by economic intuition and easy to show in 
analytical terms. From a policy perspective, however, the key question remains how large this excess 
cost turns out as it provides the price tag for other potential benefits of greener power production (e.g., 
enhanced energy security and technological progress). In the numerical analysis below we quantify the 
magnitude of the excess cost of overlapping regulation, and leave it up to policy makers to evaluate 
this cost against potential benefits. 
3. Numerical framework 
In order to quantify the implications of overlapping green and black quotas and thereby assess the 
policy relevance of our arguments, we complement our theoretical analysis with numerical simulations 
based on a partial equilibrium model of the German electricity market. Domestic electricity production 
is based on a set of discrete power generation technologies covering non-renewable thermal power 
plants (hard coal, lignite, gas, oil, nuclear) as well as power plants that operate on renewable energies 
(hydro, wind, solar, biomass, biogas). There is a distinction between extant technologies operating on 
existing capacities and new vintage technologies that require new investment. Each technology is 
                                                     
10 If feed-in tariffs are financed by the government, and not by end-users, electricity prices will unambiguously decline. 
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associated to base, middle, or peak load. Extant technologies of the same load-type trade off with a 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES), subject to a high substitution elasticity, whereas new vintage 
production can enter the respective load as a perfect substitute. The different load supplies are then 
combined towards a CES aggregate of domestic electricity supply, subject to a low substitution 
elasticity. After accounting for taxes and grid fees the domestic electricity supply together with net 
imports must satisfy domestic electricity demand. 
 
The model is calibrated to base year data for 2004, as a reference year before the German electricity 
sector became subject to CO2 emission reduction requirements under the EU emissions trading 
scheme. Market data on installed capacities, power supply by technology, electricity imports and 
exports, final demand as well as electricity prices is taken from the most recent official version of the 
German energy data collection provided by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Technology (BMWI, 2008). Technical and economic information on the different power plants is 
based on the IER technology database (IER, 2008), which includes detailed technology-specific data 
on installation cost, operating and maintenance cost, thermal efficiencies, and emission coefficients. 
Future potential capacities for renewable energies stem from the EU GreenX project (GreenX, 2008). 
Information on load patterns and utilization for the German power sector in the reference year is given 
by VDEW (2004); German taxes and fees within the electricity sector are reported by BDEW (2008); 
grid fees are based on the 4th Benchmarking Report of the European Commission (European 
Commission, 2005). 
 
Cast as a planning problem, the electricity market model corresponds to a nonlinear program that 
maximizes the sum of producer and consumer surplus. The nonlinear optimization problem can be 
interpreted as a market equilibrium problem where prices and quantities are defined using duality 
theory. In this case, a system of (weak) inequalities and complementary slackness conditions replace 
the minimization operator, yielding a so-called mixed complementarity problem (MCP), see e.g. 
Rutherford (1995).11 Two classes of conditions characterize the (competitive) equilibrium for our 
MCP model: zero profit conditions and market clearance conditions. The former class determines 
activity levels (quantities) and the latter determines prices. The economic equilibrium features 
complementarity between equilibrium variables and equilibrium conditions:  activities will be 
operated as long as they break even, positive market prices imply market clearance – otherwise 
commodities are in excess supply and the respective prices fall to zero. 
                                                     
11 A major advantage of the mixed complementarity formulation is that it allows for the incorporation of second-best 
phenomena by relaxing so-called integrability conditions (see Pressman (1970) or Takayma and Judge (1971)) which are 
inherent to economic models formulated as optimization problem. 
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Appendix 2 presents a detailed algebraic model formulation. Numerically, the model is implemented 
in GAMS (Brooke et al., 1987) using PATH (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995) as a solver. The GAMS file and 
the EXCEL reporting sheet to replicate our results are readily available from the authors upon request. 
4. Policy Scenarios and Numerical Results  
The motivation for our central case scenarios is provided by the EU’s comprehensive “climate action 
and renewable energy package” to fight climate change (European Commission 2008). Within this 
package the EU has committed itself to reducing its overall emissions to at least 20 per cent below 
1990 levels by 2020. It has also adopted the target of increasing the share of renewables in total energy 
use to 20 per cent by 2020. The climate action and renewable energy package sets out the contribution 
expected from each Member State to meeting these targets. Germany as the major CO2 emitter within 
the EU is obligated under the Kyoto Protocol and the EU-internal burden sharing agreement to cut 
back greenhouse gas emissions during 2008-2012 by on average 21 per cent from 1990 levels. Beyond 
the 1st commitment period, Germany will pursue more stringent emission cutbacks until 2020 (in fact 
up to 40 per cent from 1990 emission levels) and increase the share of renewable energies in power 
production up to 30 per cent. 
 
Against this policy background we illustrate the implications of simultaneous black and green quotas 
for the German electricity market taking a 25 per cent emission reduction vis-à-vis the reference 
emission level as a starting point (scenario BLACK). We then impose a sequential increase in the 
renewable energy share of  up to 10 percentage points on top of the renewable share emerging from 
BLACK only  (scenario BLACK&GREEN), cf. Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Overview of central case scenarios 
Scenarios Black quota Green quota 
BASELINE Not assigned Not assigned 
BLACK 25 per cent below BASELINE emission level Not assigned 
BLACK&GREEN 25 per cent below BASELINE emission level 
n percentage points increase compared 
to BLACK, { }1,10n∈  
 
With the emission constraint in place under scenario BLACK, the share of green power production 
increases from 11 to 13 per cent. Thus, in scenario BLACK&GREEN the share of green power 
production increases from 13 to 23 per cent, keeping the emission constraint fixed (the constraint is 
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always binding in our policy scenarios). Our main interest is in the comparison between the scenarios 
BLACK&GREEN and BLACK. 
 
Lignite (soft coal) has the highest CO2 emissions per kWh electricity produced, and we therefore term 
it the dirtiest technology. When the emission constraint is imposed, power production by lignite power 
plants decreases by 41 per cent if no additional green quota is in place. As one increases the share of 
green power, the adverse impacts of the carbon constraint on lignite power production declines. This is 
shown in Figure 1, which sketches the change in output of the dirtiest technology compared to the 
BLACK scenario. When the green quota is increased to 23 per cent, output from lignite power plants 
increases by 17 per cent, and is then only 31 per cent below the BASELINE level.  
 
Figure 1. Percentage change in output of lignite power production in BLACK&GREEN 
compared to BLACK 
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Imposition of a green quota on top of the black quota causes a substantial additional economic cost, cf. 
Figure 2. This must be considered as an excess burden if emission reduction is the only policy 
objective.12 Without a green quota, the compliance cost of a 25 per cent cutback of emissions in the 
German electricity system amounts to roughly 1,100 Million Euros. With increasing shares of green 
power the cost rises up to around 2,200 Million Euros, i.e., compliance cost doubles when the green 
                                                     
12 Alternatively, we may refer to the additional cost as a price tag that must be attached to the value of other potentially vague 
objectives such as decreased reliance on fossil fuels, improved technological progress etc. (see also footnote 5). 
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quota is increased by 10 percentage points. Compliance cost is calculated as loss in economic surplus, 
i.e., the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus and CO2 quota revenues. 
 
Figure 2. Percentage change in compliance cost in BLACK&GREEN compared to BLACK 
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The end-user price of electricity increases by 12 per cent when the emission constraint is introduced. 
When the green quota is also imposed, the price declines quite substantially, and is then only 4 per 
cent higher than the BASELINE level (cf. Figure 3). In other words: Imposition of an additional green 
quota leads to increased electricity demand/production as compared to the BLACK scenario. As 
mentioned in the theoretical section, the price effect of introducing a green quota is in general 
ambiguous, but the likelihood of a price reduction is higher than in the case without any emission 
constraint in place. 
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Figure 3.  Percentage change in end-user price of electricity in BLACK&GREEN compared to 
BLACK 
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The price of CO2 is 20 € per ton of CO2 in the BLACK scenario, but is depressed to 8 € per ton when 
the green quota is also imposed, cf. Figure 4. This explains why the profitability of lignite power 
production increases in the BLACK&GREEN scenario. 
 
Figure 4. Percentage change in CO2 price in BLACK&GREEN compared to BLACK 
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Consistent with reduced end-user prices, total electricity production increases in BLACK&GREEN 
compared to the BLACK scenario. This is depicted in Figure 5, which also shows that total black 
production falls and total green production rises. Production of gas power, which is black but with 
relatively low emissions, is almost halved when the green quota is increased by 10 percentage points. 
 
Figure 5. Percentage change in electricity production in BLACK&GREEN compared to 
BLACK 
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The figures above visualize the effects of increasing the green quota, given a fixed emission constraint 
of 25 per cent below BASELINE emissions. Figures 6 and 7 show respectively the relative changes in 
lignite production compared to BASELINE and the absolute loss in economic surplus of imposing 
different combinations of emission constraint and green quota. Note that the green quota in the figures 
should be read as n percentage points increase in the share of green power production compared to a 
scenario with the same emission constraint but no green quota.  
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Figure 6. Percentage change in lignite power production compared to BASELINE 
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Figure 6 confirms the conclusions above, i.e., that introducing and increasing a green quota 
consistently raises the output of lignite power production, as long as a binding emission constraint is 
held constant. Increasing the emission constraint obviously has the opposite effect.  
 
Figure 7 shows that the compliance cost of reaching an emission target increases with the stringency 
of the emission target, but also with the green quota. That is, there is significant excess cost of 
introducing a binding green quota on top of the emission constraint if the only goal is to reduce 
emissions of CO2.  
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Figure 7.  Compliance cost compared to BASELINE. Million Euros 
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5. Conclusions 
Tradable black (CO2) and green (renewables) quotas are introduced or proposed in many OECD 
countries. In this paper we have analyzed theoretically and numerically the economic implications of 
introducing a green quota on top of a black quota. 
 
We find that, although the green quota further decreases total black power production, the dirtiest 
technology will actually gain. The reason is that the green quota reduces the shadow cost of the 
emission constraint, mainly benefiting the most emission-intensive technologies. Because some black 
producers must increase their production as long as the emission constraint is binding, one effect of 
the green quota is to serve the dirtiest technology. This result may have important implications for the 
policy debate on green quotas, and is perhaps what green protagonists do not know or want to know. 
Furthermore, our numerical simulations of the German electricity market show that the excess cost of 
imposing a green quota can be quite substantial. In other words, the price tag on green quotas for the 
composite of objectives different from emission reduction is large.  
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Appendix 1 
 
In this appendix we will show the equivalence of TGC markets and uniform feed-in tariffs financed by 
an end-user tax, and derive some more results that are specific to this choice of policy scheme. We use 
the same basic model as in Section 2, and start by modeling a TGC market with producer obligations. 
This means that green power producers are allowed to issue one certificate per unit of green power 
production, whereas black power producers are required to buy a certain number β of certificates for 
each unit of black power production.13  
Equations (1) and (2) can then be specified as follows: 
(A1) ( )( )E i i i i i iMax p q c q a q q i Bσ βπ − − − ∈    
(A2) ( )( )E i i i iMax p q c q q i Gπ − + ∈  . 
First-order conditions (3) and (4) become: 
(A3) ( )( )ii i E iqc q p a i Bσ βπ= − − ∈  
(A4) ( )( )ii i Eqc q p i Gπ= + ∈ . 
In order to show that TGC is equivalent to a uniform feed-in tariff financed by an end-user tax, let the 
end-user tax be given by τ = βπ and the feed-in tariff by π* = π + τ = π (1 + β). We see from equations 
(A1) and (A2) that the maximization problems for black and green producers are the same under the 
two schemes. Moreover, tax income equals τq = βπq , whereas feed-in tariff expenditures equal π*qG = 
π(1 + β)αq = π(1 + β)(β/(1+β))q = βπq. Thus, the two policy schemes are equivalent. 
Equations (5) – (7) now become (note that π = 0 initially): 
(A5) ( )( )i ii i i E iq qc q dq dp a d d i Bσ β π= − − ∈  (i∈B) 
(A6) ( )( )i ii i i Eq qc q dq dp d i Gπ= + ∈ .  
(A7) ( )( ) ( )2( )i ii i i E i i i i E Bq q
i B i B i B i B
c q dq dp dq a dq d dq dp d dqβ π β π
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= + − = −      
From equation (A6) we have that either dqi > 0 for all i∈G, or dpE < 0 (or both). However, dpE < 0 
implies that dqG > 0 (from the demand side), and hence we must have dqi > 0 for all i∈G.  
 
                                                     
13 This measure ensures that green power production constitutes α=β/(1+β) of total power production. 
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The effect on the electricity price is in general ambiguous, and depends on the parameters of the 
model; not least the cost functions of the different power producers and the emission intensities of 
black producers. We have from equations (A6) and (A7) that (–dπ) < dpE < βdπ. An example of 
declining prices is obtained by assuming ai = aj for all i, j. Then dqi = 0 for all i∈B, and so we must 
have dq > 0 and thus dpE < 0. An example of increasing prices is obtained in the following way: 
Assume that ai = 0 for m identical black producers (e.g., nuclear), and aj = ã  > 0 for the other black 
producers. Then qj is unchanged due to the emission constraint. Assume further that there are n = m 
identical green producers (labeled g), and that ciqq < βcgqq. From equations (A5) and (A6) we see that 
we must either have dpE > 0, or (-dqi) > dqG. However, in the latter case we get dq < 0, and so dpE > 0. 
Thus, the end-user price must increase. 
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Appendix 2 
 
In this appendix we present the algebraic formulation of our numerical electricity market model. Table 
A1 depicts the notations for sets, parameters and variables underlying the model. We then provide a 
summary of the economic equilibrium conditions. Complementarity between equilibrium conditions 
and decision variables of the model are indicated by means of the “ ⊥ ”-operator. 
 
Table A1: Sets, variables and parameters 
Sets:  
I Set of all generation technologies (with index i I∈ ) 
XT(I) Subset of extant technologies (with index xt XT I∈ ⊂ ) 
NT(I) Subset of new vintage technologies (with index nt NT I∈ ⊂ ) 
( )R I  Subset of renewable technologies (with index r R I∈ ⊂ ) 
L Set of load types (with index l L∈ ) 
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Table A1 (cont.) 
Parameters:  
iy  Base-year electricity output by technology i (TWh) 
ls  Base-year electricity supply by load l (TWh) 
l
is  Base-year electricity load supply by new vintage technology (TWh) 
z  Base-year aggregate domestic electricity supply (TWh) 
x  Base-year electricity exports (TWh) 
m  Base-year electricity imports (TWh) 
d  Base-year final demand of electricity (TWh) 
ip  Base-year output price for power generation by technology i (Cent/KWh) 
lp  Base-year load-specific price of electricity (Cent/KWh) 
p  Base-year consumer price of electricity (Cent/KWh) 
Intp  International electricity price (Cent/KWh) 
t Electricity  taxes and fees (Cent/KWh) ( t := base-year taxes and fees) 
g Electricity grid fee (Cent/KWh) ( g := base-year grid fee)  
ic  Per-unit cost of electricity production by technology i (Cent/KWh)  
2ico  Per-unit CO2 emissions of electricity production by technology i  (kg/KWh) 
l
iθ  Base-year value share of technology i supply in total domestic load supply       
lθ  Base-year value share of load supply l in aggregate domestic electricity supply 
σ  Elasticity of substitution across different loads 
lσ  Elasticity of substitution across extant technologies entering load l 
η  Price elasticity of electricity final demand 
Xε  Elasticity of export demand 
Mε  Elasticity of import supply 
ˆiy  Upper capacity limit on electricity production by technology i (TWh) 
2co  Mandated CO2 emission limit – black quota (Mt CO2) 
r Mandated minimum share of renewable electricity in final electricity demand – 
green quota 
Activity levels:  
iy  Electricity output by technology i (TWh) 
ls  Electricity supply by load l (TWh) 
l
is  Electricity load supply by new vintage technology i NT∈  (TWh) 
z  Aggregate domestic electricity supply (TWh) 
x  Electricity exports (TWh) 
m  Electricity imports (TWh) 
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Table A1 (cont.) 
Price variables:  
ip  Output price for power generation by technology i (Cent/KWh) 
lp  Load-specific price of electricity (Cent/KWh) 
p  Consumer price of electricity (Cent/KWh) 
2COp  CO2 price (Euro/t) 
rp  Price premium for renewable energy (Cent/KWh) 
iμ  Scarcity rent on production capacity limit of technology i (Cent/KWh) 
 
 
Zero-profit conditions 
The zero-profit conditions for the model are as follows: 
• Zero-profit conditions for electricity production by technology i ( )iy⊥ : 
2
2
10 (1 )
i
i i co r ii R
i R
co rc p p p
r
μ
∈
∉
+ + − + ≥
−
 
 
• Zero-profit condition for load supply by new vintage technology i NT∈  ( )lis⊥ : 
i l
i l
p p i NT
→
≥ ∈  
 
• Zero-profit condition for load aggregation ( )ls⊥ :  
( )
1
1 1l l
l i l
i
i i l
p p
p p
σ σ
θ
   
−
−     ≥     
  
 
• Zero-profit condition for final demand supply ( )z⊥ : 
( )
( )
( )
1
1 1
l
l
l
p t g p
pp t g
σ σ
θ
  
−
−   + +   ≥  + +   
  
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• Zero-profit condition for electricity imports ( )m⊥ : 
1
M
r
Int
rp p p
rm m
p
ε  
−  
−  ≥    
 
 
• Zero-profit condition for electricity exports ( )x⊥ : 
1
X
r
Int
rp p p
rx x
p
ε−  
−  
−  ≥    
 
 
Market-clearance conditions: 
The market-clearance conditions for the model are as follows: 
• Market-clearance condition for electricity generated by technology i ( )ip⊥ : 
l
l ll i
i l ii i NT
l il
i l i XT
ppy y s s
pp
σ
∈
→ ∈
  
≥ +        
 
• Market-clearance condition for electricity load l ( )lp⊥ : 
( )
( )
l l
l ll i
i NT l
i l
p t g ps s s zs
pp t g
σ
∈
→
 
− − + ≥  
− − 
  
 
• Market-clearance condition for final electricity ( )p⊥ : 
pzz m x d
p
η 
+ − ≥   
 
 
• Market-clearance condition for output capacity constraint by technology i ( )iμ⊥ : 

iiy y≥  
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• Market-clearance condition for CO2 emission constraint, i.e. the black quota ( )2COp⊥ : 
2 2i i
i
co co y≥  
 
• Market-clearance condition for renewable energy share, i.e. the green quota ( )Rp⊥ : 
i
i R
py r d
p
η
∈
 
≥     
 
 
 
